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CHAPTER 13: FEATURING PEOPLE IN ADS 
 
 
Advertisements routinely depict people—their image, name, voice 
and other aspects of their personality.  This chapter looks at the 
special legal issues that arise from depicting people in ads. 
 
1. Overview of Publicity Rights 
 
Publicity rights generally protect the use of people’s names, images, 
voices or other personality attributes from unconsented 
commercialization.  Publicity rights initially were part of a person’s 
privacy rights. 
 
In the United States, privacy rights generally trace back to the 
immensely influential privacy article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis 
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  Both 
Warren and Brandeis were lawyers at the time; Brandeis went on to 
become a celebrated U.S. Supreme Court justice.   
 
The authors were reacting to improvements in camera technology.  
Initially, camera shutter speeds were so slow that people had to pose 
(i.e., stand still) for photographs.  However, technological evolutions 
reduced shutter speeds, which allowed photographers to take photos 
of people without their consent.  Warren and Brandeis argued that 
“the existing law affords a principle from which may be invoked to 
protect the privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too 
enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other 
modern device for rewording or reproducing scenes or sounds.” 
 
Recapping privacy law in the early 1960s, Dean William Prosser 
classified privacy legal claims over the intervening seventy years into 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
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four categories.  See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 
(1960) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (for which Prosser was 
the reporter).  Prosser’s four categories included “[a]ppropriation, for 
the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness,” which 
has evolved into the modern “publicity right.” 
 
Although the publicity rights doctrine is well-recognized, its legal 
implementation is a little chaotic.  There is no federal publicity right.  
Currently, about half the states statutorily codify publicity rights, 
and some statutes explicitly provide that publicity rights survive 
beyond a person’s death.  See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code § 3344.1 (surviving 
rights for seventy years post-mortem); Indiana Code 32–36 (surviving 
rights for 100 years post-mortem).  In some states, publicity rights 
are protected by common law doctrines.  In a few states, publicity 
rights are concurrently protected both by statute and the common 
law. 
 
Because many celebrities reside there, California and New York play 
particularly important roles in the development of publicity rights 
laws.  However, publicity rights are not limited to celebrities, and 
they usually equally protect both well-known and unknown 
individuals. 
 
Publicity rights generally govern two discrete activities: first, the 
“merchandizing” of a person by selling an item that incorporates some 
identifiable part of the person, such as the incorporation of a 
celebrity’s image on a t-shirt or a videogame containing a character 
that has similarities with an actual person, and second, the depiction 
of a person in ad copy.  Given the book’s emphasis, this chapter 
focuses almost exclusively on the ad copy cases.  Typically, the ad 
copy cases are doctrinally easier than the merchandizing cases, but 
both types of cases can create difficult line-drawing situations.  In 
addition, the publicity rights doctrines have an uneasy fit with the 
First Amendment, especially in the merchandizing context.   
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
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Publicity rights only apply to individuals; companies or other 
business organizations rely on trademark law and related doctrines.  
If a person’s name develops secondary meaning in association with 
commercial offerings, people can develop trademark rights in their 
name or other attributes to complement their publicity rights (which 
exist automatically).  When enforcing those rights, trademark law 
requires that the usage creates a likelihood of consumer confusion.  In 
contrast, consumer confusion is irrelevant to a publicity rights claim. 
 
2. Publicity Rights and Ad Copy 
 
As a baseline proposition with only limited exceptions, depicting a 
person in ad copy requires the person’s consent.  Even with this fairly 
clear rule, plenty of ambiguity remains.  This part looks at the 
depiction of various personality attributes to explore the boundaries 
of the publicity rights doctrine. 
 
A. A Person’s Name 
 
In reading this opinion, it may be helpful to know that a “Henley 
shirt” is a collarless polo shirt.  It is named after Henley-on-Thames, 
England, whose rowers wore uniforms in this style. 
 
Henley v. Dillard Department Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. 
Tex. 1999) 
 
. . . FACTS . . . 
 
Plaintiff Donald Hugh Henley (“Henley” or “Plaintiff”), is a popular 
and critically acclaimed rock and roll musician.  He began his music 
career in the 1970s as the founder and member of the band The 
Eagles.  In the 1980s and 1990s, Henley maintained a successful solo 
career by continuing to produce platinum albums and perform on tour 
in concerts around the world.  
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On September 3 and 4, 1997, Defendant Dillard Department Stores 
(“Dillard” or “Defendant”) ran a newspaper advertisement for a shirt 
known as a “henley.”  The ad features a photograph of a man wearing 
a henley shirt with the words, “This is Don” in large print, beside the 
picture, and an arrow pointing toward the man’s head from the 
words.  Underneath the words is the statement, “This is Don’s 
henley” in the same size print, with a second arrow pointing to the 
shirt.  The advertisement also included the name of the retailer, 
“Dillard’s”, general information about the sale price of the shirts, the 
name of the shirt’s manufacturer, the available sizes and the 
following: “Sometimes Don tucks it in; other times he wears it loose—
it looks great either way.  Don loves his henley; you will too.”  The ad 
ran in newspapers throughout Texas and in Mexico. 
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DISCUSSION . . . 
 
B.  Right to Publicity 
 
The right of publicity is often described as the “inherent right of every 
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”  
The right to publicity is considered an intellectual property right.  It 
is a more expansive right than any common law or statutory 
trademark infringement right because it does not require a showing 
of likelihood of confusion. 
 
The tort of misappropriation of one’s name or likeness is generally 
referred to as the “Right of Publicity” and is based on section 652C of 
the Restatement of Torts which reads, “One who appropriates to his 
own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”  The Fifth Circuit 
has specifically identified three elements a plaintiff must prove to 
recover for the tort of misappropriation of name and likeness in 
Texas: (1) the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s name or likeness 
for the value associated with it, and not in an incidental manner or 
for a newsworthy purpose; (2) the plaintiff can be identified from the 
publication; and (3) there was some advantage or benefit to the 
defendant. 
 
The right of publicity is designed to protect the commercial interests 
of celebrities in their identities.  It is intended to protect the value of 
a celebrity’s notoriety or skill.  Because a celebrity’s identity can be 
valuable in the promotion of products, “the celebrity has an interest 
that may be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation 
of that identity.”  Such celebrities have an exclusive legal right to 
control and profit from the commercial use of their name, personality 
and identity.  “If the celebrity’s identity is commercially exploited, 
there has been an invasion of his right whether or not his ‘name or 
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likeness’ is used.”  The tort does not protect the use of the celebrity’s 
name per se, but rather the value associated with that name. . . . 
 
1.  Did Defendant Appropriate the Plaintiff’s Name or Likeness for 
the Value Associated with it, and not in an Incidental Manner or for a 
Newsworthy Purpose? 
 
The threshold issue to determine in analyzing this element is 
whether Defendant actually appropriated Defendant’s name or 
likeness. . . . 
 
While use of the expression “Don’s henley” is arguably the use of 
Plaintiff’s name, a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether that 
expression is, indeed, Plaintiff’s name.  However, Courts have 
recognized that a defendant may be held liable for using a phrase or 
image that clearly identifies the celebrity, in addition to finding 
liability for using a plaintiff’s precise name.  Because the use of the 
expression “Don’s henley” is so clearly recognizable as a likeness of 
Plaintiff, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that 
the phrase “Don’s henley” does not clearly identify the Plaintiff, Don 
Henley. . . . 
 
The second issue the Court must resolve is whether Defendant 
appropriated Plaintiff’s name or likeness for the value associated 
with it, and not in an incidental manner.  Defendant argues that 
“there has been no evidence presented that Dillard chose to use the 
wording ‘Don’s henley’ in order to capitalize on the alleged value of 
the name Don Henley.”  The Court disagrees, and in fact, finds that 
Defendant has presented no reasonable evidence to defeat Plaintiff’s 
summary judgment motion.  Plaintiff presents uncontroverted 
deposition testimony from Lisa M. Robertson, the creator of the print 
advertisement, admitting that use of Don Henley’s ‘name’ was 
intended to make the ad more interesting.  She . . . intended to use 
the expression as a “play on words” and intended consumers to 
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recognize this advertisement as a “wordplay” on the name “Don 
Henley.”2  In other words, Defendant admitted that she did not 
intend potential consumers to perceive the ad as depicting an 
anonymous man named “Don.”  She intended for them to associate 
the expression “Don’s henley” with the Plaintiff Don Henley.  
Furthermore, Debra L. Green, the ad’s designer, admitted that she 
believed the expression “Don’s henley” would catch the consumers’ 
eye because of its similarity to the name “Don Henley.”3  Therefore, 
Defendant admits Dillard used the play on words, “Don’s henley” to 
attract consumers as they associated the expression and the ad with 
Plaintiff Don Henley.  In other words, they used the value associated 
                                                          
2 Q: Well, what prompted you to come up with the idea “This is Don. This is 
Don’s Henley”? 
A: Well, I was trying to find a play on words to use for the ad. 
Q: And there’s no doubt that when you were using the words “This is Don.  
This is Don’s henley,” the Don Henley wordplay meant Don Henley the 
recording artist, not some other person named Don Henley? 
A: Well, obviously the name—yes, I mean I knew it was Don Henley; that 
was where it came from.  But it wasn’t, you know, to imply that he was a part 
of it. 
Q: I think you said earlier that by using the word—by using the headline 
“This is Don.  This is Don’s henley,” you intended a wordplay, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And so it was your intention for consumers to recognize this advertisement 
as a wordplay. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And for the wordplay to work, the consumer had to recognize the name 
Don Henley, right? 
A: Well, you’d have to know who he was to get it, yes. 
Q: So for it to work or for them to get it, they must recognize the similarity 
between the words “This is Don.  This is Don’s henley” and the name of the 
recording artist Don Henley, correct? 
A: Yes. 
3 Q: Do you think that the words “Don’s,” apostrophe “s,” “henley” would 
catch a consumer’s eye? 
A: I think the sound of them reading it would repeat the sound of—I think 
that that would in some way associate with Don. 
Q: Well, my question is would it have caught your average consumer’s eye, 
the use of the words “Don’s henley”? 
A: I think so. 
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with Don Henley’s identity and personality in order to attract 
consumers’ attention. 
 
Defendant presents testimony from Dillard’s Vice President of Sales 
Promotion, William B. Warner, suggesting that the use of the words 
“Don’s henley” adds no value to the advertisement.4  Warner testified 
that he believes there is no value associated with the expression 
“Don’s henley,” and that the singular and sole purpose of choosing 
and printing that phrase was “fun.”  In fact, Defendant argues, the 
use of the expression, “Don’s henley” was incidental to the primary 
focus of the advertisement.  The portions of the ad that were of “chief 
importance” were the “handwritten text and arrows . . . the visual 
presentation of information.” . . .  
 
. . . The Court finds it unreasonable to draw the inference Defendant 
requests.  Defendant’s evidence could not lead a reasonable jury to 
conclude that the use of the words “Don’s henley” was for any purpose 
other than to attract the attention of consumers. 
 
Defendant also insists that its use of the phrase “Don’s henley” was 
incidental to the handwritten style of the text and arrows.  “ ‘[O]ne of 
the primary purposes of advertising is to motivate a decision to 
purchase a particular product or service.  The first step toward selling 
a product or service is to attract the consumers’ attention.’ ”  
Defendant’s use of the message “This is Don.  This is Don’s henley.” in 
large letters, centered in the print ad was clearly and admittedly 
intended to attract the consumers’ attention.  The Court is hard 
                                                          
4 Q: Did the words—in your opinion, do the words “Don” and “Don’s henley” 
help make the ad more effective? 
A: I think not.  I think they make it fun, but not necessarily in any way that 
would actually make it more effective from the standpoint of achieving what 
a good ad is intended to achieve. 
Q: Was it you [sic] opinion that the words “Don” and “Don’s henley” add no 
value at all to the ad? 
A: That’s my basic opinion. 
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pressed to believe that a reasonable jury could conclude that the size 
and style of the letters, rather than the message created with those 
letters, are the focus of the ad.  No reasonable jury could conclude 
that the use of the word play was merely incidental to the 
advertisement. 
 
2.  Can the Plaintiff be Identified from the Publication? 
 
The second element Plaintiff must satisfy to prove an infringement of 
the Right of Publicity, is that “plaintiff as a human being must be 
‘identifiable’ from the total context of the defendant’s use.”  While 
there are many ways a plaintiff can be identified in a defendant’s use, 
the most obvious is use of a name that distinguishes the plaintiff.  
“Identifiability of plaintiff will probably not be a disputable issue in 
the majority of meritorious Right of Publicity cases.”  This is due to 
the fact that defendants will usually make the plaintiff’s identity as 
identifiable as possible so as to draw the maximum amount of 
attention to the defendant’s product.  “The intent, state of mind and 
degree of knowledge of a defendant may shed light on the 
identifiability issue.”  “To establish liability, plaintiff need prove no 
more than that he or she is reasonably identifiable in defendant’s use 
to more than a de [minimis] number of persons.” . . . 
 
The Court finds that the issue of identifiability is indisputable in this 
case because Defendant has offered no evidence to suggest that 
Plaintiff is not identifiable from the ad.  Plaintiff’s survey evidence 
indicates that sixty-five percent of survey respondents believed there 
was a spokesperson or endorser in the ad.  Of those who said there 
was a spokesperson or endorser, twenty-three percent said the 
spokesperson or endorser was Don Henley.8  In other words, fifteen 
                                                          
8 It is arguable that, had the respondents been shown Defendant’s ad and 
been asked “Who do you think is identified in this ad?” a different result 
would have occurred.  In order to name Don Henley as the spokesperson or 
endorser of the ad (as the question was asked by the surveyor), the surveyees 
CHAPTER 13: FEATURING PEOPLE IN ADS 
 
 
1019 
percent of those asked believed Don Henley was a spokesman for or 
endorser of the ad, and thus, necessarily identified him from the ad.  
The results of this survey clearly prove that Don Henley was 
reasonably identifiable in Defendant’s ad to more than a de [minimis] 
number of persons. 
 
Further, in evaluating the intent and state of mind of Defendant, the 
evidence is undisputed that Defendant intended to appropriate Don 
Henley’s identity and intended that consumers associate the ad with 
Don Henley.  First, as stated supra, the creators of the ad admitted 
they intended consumers to associate Don Henley with the ad.  
Second, the Defendant intended to appropriate the image of 
performing artist Don Henley, not some other, anonymous person by 
that same name.  This is proven by Plaintiff’s evidence that the ad 
creators drafted an earlier version of the ad that added quotes or 
paraphrases from eight Don Henley song titles to the ad at issue.9  
The Court concludes that there is no fact issue from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was not identifiable from 
the ad. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                  
were required to believe the ad was, in fact, endorsed by Henley.  Had the 
surveyees been asked the question “Who do you think is identified in this 
ad?” it is likely that the number responding “Don Henley” would have 
increased due to the fact that they would not have been required to believe he 
endorsed the product or gave his permission to have his name or likeness 
used in the ad.  They would only have been required to believe he was 
identifiable from the ad. 
9 The ad, in draft form read, “If all you want to do is dance / pick up your 
witchy woman / take it to the limit in our cotton henley.  We promise, you’ve 
spent your last worthless evening!  Give her the best of your love, and when 
the party’s over, toss our machine washable henley right in the dirty laundry.  
In the long run, you’ll love the great colors and the super-sturdy construction.  
But hurry in, they may be already gone.” [Editor’s note: we underlined the 
song titles, which are a mixture of Eagles songs and Don Henley solo songs.] 
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3.  Was there an Advantage or Benefit to Defendant? 
 
Defendant insists that Plaintiff cannot prove a benefit inured to 
Dillard because the sales generated by the ad were not sufficient to 
cover the costs of running the ad.  Plaintiff argues that the Court 
need consider no more than the fact that the ad was created with the 
belief that the use of the words “Don’s henley” would help sell its 
product. 
 
. . . Comment d [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C] reads: 
“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating 
to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated 
with the name or likeness that the right of privacy is invaded.”  
Comment d further suggests that the notion that a benefit must inure 
to the defendant is intertwined with the factor requiring that the 
plaintiff prove the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness for its value and not for an incidental use.  The “benefit” 
element requires Plaintiff to prove that Defendant derived some 
commercial benefit from the use of plaintiff’s name or likeness as 
opposed to deriving no commercial benefit due to the fact that the use 
was incidental. . . . 
 
The plaintiff in a right to publicity action is not required to show that 
the defendant made money off the commercial use of the name or 
likeness, as Defendant suggests.  It is immaterial that Defendant 
made little profit after the ad ran, only ran the advertisement once, 
and received no feedback on the ad.  What Plaintiff must prove is that 
Defendant received a commercial benefit from use of Plaintiff’s name 
or likeness that, without Plaintiff’s image, he would not otherwise 
have received.  Defendant’s sophisticated and experienced ad creators 
described the benefit they received as being able to catch the eye of 
the consumer and make the ad more interesting.  By appropriating 
Plaintiff’s name or likeness, Defendant received the benefit of a 
celebrity endorsement without asking permission or paying a fee.  
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To reiterate an earlier point, the Right of Publicity cause of action 
exists to protect a celebrity’s identity, which can be valuable in the 
promotion of products.  Such celebrities have an exclusive legal right 
to control and profit from the commercial use of their name, 
personality and identity. . . . The Court, thus, refuses to require a 
plaintiff to prove that a defendant made a profit or secured a tangible 
benefit from use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness. 
 
. . . Defendant should not be shielded from liability because “the 
product promoted is undesirable, the ad [is] clumsy or somehow 
ineffective, or sales slump[ed] during the relevant time period.”  
Rather, Dillard should be held liable because it received a benefit by 
getting to use a celebrity’s name for free in its advertising.  Whether 
or not the advertising worked for Dillard is wholly irrelevant.  The 
Court concludes that there is no fact issue from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude that Defendant did not receive a benefit from its 
use of Plaintiff’s likeness. . . . 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Celebrities v. Ordinary People.  This case emphasizes Don Henley’s 
celebrity status.  However, as cases such as the Cohen case discussed 
later illustrate, celebrity status is not required for a valid publicity 
rights claim. 
 
Variations.  Would the result have changed if Dillard had referenced 
“Donald’s henley”?  “Dawn’s henley”?  “Don Juan’s henley”?  Once the 
court believed that Dillard was intentionally trying to evoke Don 
Henley, was Dillard liable no matter what variation of “Don Henley” 
they used?  The ad derives value from the pun on Henley’s name, but 
the court doesn’t seem interested in the fact that it required extra 
mental effort for consumers to decode the pun. 
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Consumer Survey.  The case says “fifteen percent of those asked 
believed Don Henley was a spokesman for or endorser of the ad.”  
Does the result change if all of the other 85% clearly understood that 
the ad was a joke?  Does this case suggest that the perceptions of a 
small minority of consumers can veto advertising that the majority 
understand as a joke? 
 
Consumer surveys are common in trademark and false advertising 
cases, but they are relatively rare in publicity rights cases. 
 
Celebrities on a First-name Basis.  During the 2010 Super Bowl, the 
online brokerage E*Trade ran one of its “talking baby” commercials.  
In the commercial, the protagonist is explaining to his “girlfriend” (a 
baby girl) that he didn’t call because he was taking advantage of 
E*Trade.  The girlfriend accusatorily asks, “And that milkaholic 
Lindsay wasn’t over?”  After an awkward pause, the protagonist then 
replies “Lindsay?” in an unsure voice while a previously unseen baby 
girl in the protagonist’s room—presumably, the “Lindsay” both babies 
are referencing—reveals herself to the camera and says “Milk-a-
what?” 
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This ad prompted a $50 million lawsuit from Lindsay Lohan, a 
successful teen actress who battled highly publicized substance-
addiction issues.  Lohan v. E*Trade Securities LLC, No. 10-004579 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. complaint filed March 8, 2010).  Lohan claimed that 
the ad’s “Lindsay” references were meant to be her.  Among other 
things, she claimed that her first name is so well-known that ad 
viewers would have assumed it was her. 
 
If you represented Lohan, what evidence would you try to introduce 
to show that “Lindsay” referenced your client? 
 
Lohan was born in 1986.  In the 1980s, “Lindsay” was the 44th most 
popular girl name according to the Baby NameVoyager (and the 
sound-alike “Lindsey” was the 42nd most popular).  In 2008, 
“Lindsay” was the 380th most popular girl’s name.  Is either fact 
relevant? 
 
Would it matter if the first draft of the commercial referred to the 
Lindsay character as “Deborah”?  Or does every first name have the 
possibility of some celebrity with the same name claiming the ad 
refers to him or her? 
 
Lohan and E*Trade subsequently settled the lawsuit on confidential 
terms.* 
 
Does the following billboard, promoting tourism with the slogan 
“MORE RUSH THAN YOU GET FROM TALK RADIO,” 
misappropriate anyone’s personality rights?  Does the capitalization 
matter? 
 
                                                          
* Lindsay Lohan may have an unusually expansive view of her publicity 
rights, including a pending lawsuit against Grand Theft Auto V for 
containing an actress character and a failed lawsuit against the singer 
Pitbull for using her name in rap lyrics. 
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What about a New Orleans billboard for local favorite Zatarain’s 
Fish-Fri with the tagline “AS SEEN ON OKRA”?  
 
How about the following ad and product name?  Elroy Hirsch was a 
University of Wisconsin athlete who went on to become a successful 
and well-known pro football player.  Hirsch got the nickname 
“Crazylegs” as described in Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son. Inc., 280 
N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979): 
 
In the fourth game of his first season of play at Wisconsin, he 
acquired the name, “Crazylegs.”  In that game, Hirsch ran 62 
yards for a touchdown, wobbling down the sideline looking as 
though he might step out of bounds at any moment.  Hirsch’s 
unique running style, which looked something like a whirling 
eggbeater, drew the attention of a sportswriter for the 
Chicago Daily News who tagged Hirsch with the nickname, 
“Crazylegs.”  It is undisputed that the name stuck, and 
Hirsch has been known as “Crazylegs” ever since.  
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The court upheld Hirsch’s claim against the product name.  Are you 
surprised by that result?  Why or why not? 
 
Is there any situation where a depiction of a celebrity wouldn’t 
qualify as a benefit to the advertiser?  Courts have been very 
celebrity-favorable in this context.  In Abdul-Jabbar v. General 
Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996), for example, the former 
basketball star Kareem Abdul-Jabbar alleged that GMC violated the 
Lanham Act and California’s statutory and common law right of 
publicity by using his former name, Lew Alcindor, without his 
consent, in a television ad aired during the 1993 NCAA men’s 
basketball tournament.  The court of appeals agreed that a jury could 
find GMC liable. 
 
The ad involved a voiceover that asked, “Who holds the record for 
being voted the most outstanding player of this tournament?”  The 
screen then displayed, “Lew Alcindor, UCLA, ‘67, ‘68, ‘69.”  The 
voiceover then asked, “Has any car made the ‘Consumer Digest’s Best 
Buy’ list more than once?  [and responds:] The Oldsmobile Eighty-
Eight has.”  The ad also called the car “A Definite First Round Pick.”  
Abdul-Jabbar adopted his present name in 1971, and hadn’t used 
“Lew Alcindor” for commercial purposes in over ten years at the time 
of decision.  The court of appeals reasoned that, under California 
common law, the key issue was whether his “identity” had been 
appropriated; California statutory law protected “name, voice, 
signature, photograph, or likeness.”  Using the former name could 
constitute use of his “identity,” and the statute wasn’t limited to 
presently used names.  “To the extent GMC’s use of the plaintiff’s 
birth name attracted television viewers’ attention, GMC gained a 
commercial advantage.”  Whether the name Lew Alcindor “equalled” 
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar in consumers’ minds was a question for the 
jury.   
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In addition, Abdul-Jabbar provided sufficient evidence for a jury to 
find that he was injured “economically because the ad will make it 
difficult for him to endorse other automobiles, and emotionally 
because people may be led to believe he has abandoned his current 
name and assume he has renounced his religion.”  (Abdul-Jabbar 
changed his name as a result of his religious conversion to Islam.)   
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Abandonment via Name-change.  This case addresses a celebrity 
name-change when the “abandoned” name was also well-known, a 
relatively unusual circumstance.  A more likely scenario is the 
celebrity’s adoption of a new stage name that becomes more well-
known than his or her birth name.  For example, the real name of 50 
Cent is Curtis Jackson.  If ad copy referenced Curtis Jackson, would 
that violate his publicity rights if few consumers would realize that is 
the same person as 50 Cent?  In the case of post-mortem publicity 
rights, some statutes require the individual to have commercialized 
his or her name before death as a precondition of descendibility. 
 
References to Celebrities in Ad Copy.  Why isn’t it okay that GM 
merely recited a true fact that Alcindor was the NCAA tournament 
MVP three times?  What changes, if any, could GM make to its ad 
copy to reference Lew Alcindor and not violate his publicity rights?  
Does this case imply that no changes would have satisfied the court, 
i.e., that merely mentioning Alcindor in the ad copy is a per se 
publicity rights violation? 
 
In the discussion about GM’s liability for false endorsement under the 
Lanham Act and the possibility of a nominative use defense, the court 
says: 
 
Had GMC limited itself to the “trivia” portion of its ad, GMC 
could likely defend the reference to Lew Alcindor as a 
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nominative fair use.  But by using Alcindor’s record to make a 
claim for its car—like the basketball star, the Olds 88 won an 
“award” three years in a row, and like the star, the car is a 
“champ” and a “first round pick”—GMC has arguably 
attempted to “appropriate the cachet of one product for 
another,” if not also to “capitalize on consumer confusion.”  
We therefore hold that there is a question of fact as to 
whether GMC is entitled to a fair use defense. 
 
This seems to suggest that GMC could have referenced Alcindor if it 
did not try to connect Alcindor’s accomplishments to its product 
claims.  But if GMC doesn’t make that cognitive connection for the 
viewer, why would GMC invoke Alcindor’s accomplishments?  Worse, 
it might be even more suspicious if GMC invoked Alcindor’s 
accomplishments without tying them to product claims; otherwise, it 
might look even more like an implied endorsement from 
Alcindor/Abdul-Jabbar.  Given that GMC faces trouble either way, 
does this support the inference that GMC could not revamp the ad 
copy to reference Alcindor? 
 
Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014), held 
that an ad congratulating Jordan in a special issue of Sports 
Illustrated celebrating Michael Jordan’s career was commercial 
speech, and that therefore Jordan’s Lanham Act and right of publicity 
claims could proceed.  What sort of commercial advantage could Jewel 
have been seeking from running this ad? 
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Tweeting about Celebrities.  A paparazzi photographed actress 
Katherine Heigl exiting a Duane Reade drugstore carrying two 
Duane Reade shopping bags.  Duane Reade then tweeted the photo 
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with the text “Love a quick #DuaneReade run?  Even @KatieHeigl 
can’t resist shopping #NYC’s favorite drugstore.”  
 
 
 
Assume that everything about the tweet is true, and assume Duane 
Reade properly procured the necessary copyright license to the photo.  
Does Katherine Heigl have a valid right of publicity claim against 
Duane Reade?  See Heigl v. Duane Reade, Inc., 14 CV 2502 (S.D.N.Y. 
complaint filed Apr. 9, 2014).  If you think Duane Reade went too far, 
what (if anything) could they do to share this photo with their 
audiences without Heigl’s permission? 
 
Test Yourself:  In July 2014, NBA basketball player LeBron James, 
often nicknamed “King James,” announced that he was re-signing 
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with the Cleveland Cavaliers.  This announcement sparked a flurry of 
tweets on Twitter.  Which of the following do you think are legally 
problematic? 
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Press Releases.  Recall Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC from Chapter 
2, which held that a Cingular press release touting its disaster 
preparedness equipment called MACH 1 and MACH 2 and invoking 
legendary pilot Chuck Yeager’s accomplishment of flying at Mach 1 
speed could violate Yeager’s publicity rights.   
 
Ad Agency Liability.  The court treated the advertiser (GM) and its ad 
agency (Leo Burnett) as equally liable for the publicity rights 
violation.  For more on this, see Chapter 16, Sec. 1. 
 
Personality Trademarks and Publicity Rights Compared.  In some 
cases, individuals may have protectable trademarks in addition to 
their publicity rights.  Recall that getting a trademark requires 
making a “use in commerce” of the term, such as by affixing a 
person’s name or likeness on goods or services available in the 
marketplace.  Furthermore, to get a trademark in a personal name, 
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the individual has to show that their name has achieved secondary 
meaning, i.e., that when consumers see the name, they think of a 
single source of marketplace goods or services.  Think, for example, of 
the many celebrities who launch lines of clothing under their name, 
such as the Kardashian Kollection for Sears. 
 
As a result of the use in commerce and secondary meaning 
requirements, non-celebrities rarely will have trademark rights 
protecting some aspect of their personality.  For that matter, most 
celebrities will not have protectable trademark rights, either because 
they have not merchandized their personality or have not achieved 
the requisite secondary meaning. 
 
Even when celebrities have trademark rights in their personalities, 
publicity rights claims are usually easier to win (unless they are in a 
jurisdiction which has not clearly recognized publicity rights at all) 
because publicity rights do not require showing a likelihood of 
consumer confusion about product source.  Also, as the Henley and 
Abdul-Jabbar cases indicate, courts will often apply publicity rights 
doctrines broadly, while they may be reluctant to expand trademark 
doctrine so freely. 
 
Nevertheless, if they are eligible for trademark protection, celebrities 
may find value in securing federal trademark registration to 
complement their publicity rights.  For example, federal trademark 
registration ensures access to federal courts (rather than state courts) 
and consistent minimum protectable rights across all jurisdictions.  
Also, trademark registrations can improve standing for certain types 
of actions, such as counterfeiting claims or domain-name enforcement 
actions. 
 
Keyword Advertising on Names.  Assume that an advertiser 
purchases a person’s name as the trigger for its keyword advertising, 
i.e., when searchers use the search query “Joe Smith,” the 
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advertisement displays.  Assume the plaintiff does not have any 
trademark rights in his or her name.  Does the purchase of the 
keyword advertising trigger violate the person’s publicity or privacy 
rights?  Does it matter if the ad copy references the name?  See 
Habush v. Cannon, 346 Wis. 2d 709 (Wis. App. Ct. 2013) (dismissing 
a Wisconsin publicity rights claim for one lawyer purchasing keyword 
ads on another lawyer’s name).   
 
In 2010, Google used to say, “Don’t use proper names as keywords.  
Sites that promote people-finder services, detective agencies, or other 
similar services are not permitted to use proper names in ad text or 
as keywords.”  As of 2014, it says “We do not monitor the use of 
proper names in AdWords ads or keywords.” 
 
B. A Person’s Voice 
 
California’s publicity rights statute expressly protects the use of a 
person’s voice in ad copy.  However, does that prevent an advertiser 
from using a “sound-alike”? 
 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) 
 
This case centers on the protectibility [sic] of the voice of a celebrated 
chanteuse from commercial exploitation without her consent.  Ford 
Motor Company and its advertising agency, Young & Rubicam, Inc., 
in 1985 advertised the Ford Lincoln Mercury with a series of nineteen 
30 or 60 second television commercials in what the agency called “The 
Yuppie Campaign.”  The aim was to make an emotional connection 
with Yuppies,* bringing back memories of when they were in college.  
Different popular songs of the seventies were sung on each 
commercial.  The agency tried to get “the original people,” that is, the 
singers who had popularized the songs, to sing them.  Failing in that 
                                                          
* [Editor’s note: “Yuppie” is an acronym for “Young Urban Professional,” an 
affluent segment of the Baby Boomers.] 
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endeavor in ten cases the agency had the songs sung by “sound-
alikes.”  Bette Midler, the plaintiff and appellant here, was done by a 
sound-alike. 
 
Midler is a nationally known actress and singer.  She won a Grammy 
as early as 1973 as the Best New Artist of that year.  Records made 
by her since then have gone Platinum and Gold.  She was nominated 
in 1979 for an Academy award for Best Female Actress in The Rose, 
in which she portrayed a pop singer.  Newsweek in its June 30, 1986 
issue described her as an “outrageously original singer/comedian.”  
Time hailed her in its March 2, 1987 issue as “a legend” and “the 
most dynamic and poignant singer-actress of her time.” 
 
When Young & Rubicam was preparing the Yuppie Campaign it 
presented the commercial to its client by playing an edited version of 
Midler singing “Do You Want To Dance,” taken from the 1973 Midler 
album, “The Divine Miss M.”  After the client accepted the idea and 
form of the commercial, the agency contacted Midler’s manager, Jerry 
Edelstein.  The conversation went as follows: “Hello, I am Craig 
Hazen from Young and Rubicam.  I am calling you to find out if Bette 
Midler would be interested in doing . . . ?  Edelstein: “Is it a 
commercial?”  “Yes.”  “We are not interested.” 
 
Undeterred, Young & Rubicam sought out Ula Hedwig whom it knew 
to have been one of “the Harlettes,” a backup singer for Midler for ten 
years.  Hedwig was told by Young & Rubicam that “they wanted 
someone who could sound like Bette Midler’s recording of [Do You 
Want To Dance].”  She was asked to make a “demo” tape of the song if 
she was interested.  She made an a capella demo and got the job. 
 
At the direction of Young & Rubicam, Hedwig then made a record for 
the commercial.  The Midler record of “Do You Want To Dance” was 
first played to her.  She was told to “sound as much as possible like 
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the Bette Midler record,” leaving out only a few “aahs” unsuitable for 
the commercial.  Hedwig imitated Midler to the best of her ability. 
 
After the commercial was aired Midler was told by “a number of 
people” that it “sounded exactly” like her record of “Do You Want To 
Dance.”  Hedwig was told by “many personal friends” that they 
thought it was Midler singing the commercial.  Ken Fritz, a personal 
manager in the entertainment business not associated with Midler, 
declares by affidavit that he heard the commercial on more than one 
occasion and thought Midler was doing the singing. 
 
Neither the name nor the picture of Midler was used in the 
commercial; Young & Rubicam had a license from the copyright 
holder to use the song.  At issue in this case is only the protection of 
Midler’s voice.  The district court described the defendants’ conduct as 
that “of the average thief.”  They decided, “If we can’t buy it, we’ll 
take it.”  The court nonetheless believed there was no legal principle 
preventing imitation of Midler’s voice and so gave summary judgment 
for the defendants.  Midler appeals. . . . 
 
California Civil Code section 3344 is also of no aid to Midler.  The 
statute affords damages to a person injured by another who uses the 
person’s “name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness, in any 
manner.”  The defendants did not use Midler’s name or anything else 
whose use is prohibited by the statute.  The voice they used was 
Hedwig’s, not hers.  The term “likeness” refers to a visual image not a 
vocal imitation.  The statute, however, does not preclude Midler from 
pursuing any cause of action she may have at common law; the 
statute itself implies that such common law causes of action do exist 
because it says its remedies are merely “cumulative.” 
 
The companion statute protecting the use of a deceased person’s 
name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness states that the rights 
it recognizes are “property rights.”  By analogy the common law 
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rights are also property rights.  Appropriation of such common law 
rights is a tort in California. . . . 
 
Why did the defendants ask Midler to sing if her voice was not of 
value to them?  Why did they studiously acquire the services of a 
sound-alike and instruct her to imitate Midler if Midler’s voice was 
not of value to them?  What they sought was an attribute of Midler’s 
identity.  Its value was what the market would have paid for Midler 
to have sung the commercial in person. 
 
. . . A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face.  The human voice 
is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested.  We are all 
aware that a friend is at once known by a few words on the phone.  At 
a philosophical level it has been observed that with the sound of a 
voice, “the other stands before me.”  A fortiori, these observations 
hold true of singing, especially singing by a singer of renown.  The 
singer manifests herself in the song.  To impersonate her voice is to 
pirate her identity. 
 
We need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a 
voice to advertise merchandise is actionable.  We hold only that when 
a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is 
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have 
appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in 
California.  Midler has made a showing, sufficient to defeat summary 
judgment, that the defendants here for their own profit in selling 
their product did appropriate part of her identity. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Why Copyright Wasn’t an Issue.  Bobby Freeman wrote the song “Do 
You Wanna Dance?” and recorded it in 1958.  A 1965 cover version by 
the Beach Boys is perhaps the best known version.  Midler herself 
covered the song, with a jazzier and much slower arrangement, under 
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the title “Do You Want To Dance?” in 1973.  Therefore, Midler did not 
own the copyright to the song, and her permission was not required 
for Ford to perform the copyrighted song in the advertisement.  
Because Ford did not use Midler’s 1973 recording either, it did not 
need a copyright license for that recording. 
 
Damages.  On remand, a jury awarded Midler $400,000 from Ford’s 
ad agency Young & Rubicam (Ford had already exited the case).  
Midler had asked for damages of $10 million.  How should damages 
be computed in a sound-alike case? 
 
Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), a sound-alike 
case involving raspy-voiced singer Tom Waits and a radio 
advertisement for “SalsaRio Doritos,” explores that question.  The 
jury awarded $2.6 million in compensatory and punitive damages and 
attorneys’ fees against the manufacturer Frito-Lay and its 
advertising agency Tracy-Locke.  The defendants appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit. That court upheld the award in its entirety, ruling that 
damages were not limited to economic injury (though the economic 
value of the use to the advertiser is important for liability).  Injury to 
Waits’ peace, happiness and feelings was also compensable.   
 
He was particularly embarrassed by the ad because it seemed to 
contradict his anti-commercial stance: “because of his outspoken 
public stance against doing commercial endorsements, the Doritos 
commercial humiliated Waits by making him an apparent hypocrite.”   
 
In addition, the jury could award him damages for injury to goodwill 
(his artistic reputation and reputation for refusing to endorse 
products).  Further, the court upheld an award based on lost future 
publicity value.  If Waits did do a commercial in the future, his 
asking price would be lowered because of the Doritos ad.   
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Moreover, the court upheld the punitive damages award, holding that 
the jury could have found the defendants’ conduct “despicable because 
they knowingly impugned Waits’ integrity in the public eye,” and that 
defendants acted in conscious disregard of Waits’s right of publicity.   
 
Asking Permission.  Businesspeople frequently believe that “it’s 
better to ask for forgiveness than permission.”  Are the Midler and 
Waits cases consistent with this maxim?  When you are a practicing 
lawyer, will you prospectively ask IP rightsholders for their consent 
in ambiguous situations, or do these opinions make you a little gun-
shy? 
 
Singers Closely Identified with Famous Songs.  Assume that ad copy 
includes a performance of a properly licensed song sung by a non-
sound-alike.  On publicity rights grounds, can a singer of that song 
nevertheless object to use of that song because the song is so closely 
identified with him or her?  The answer appears to be no. 
 
Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) 
involved Goodyear’s radio and television ads promoting its “wide 
boots” tires.  The ad copy included portions of the song “These Boots 
Are Made For Walkin’,” a 1966 #1 hit for Nancy Sinatra (the 
daughter of Frank Sinatra).  The ad agency properly secured licenses 
to the song’s copyrights, owned by Criterion Music (not Sinatra).  
Sinatra alleged, among other things, “that the song has been so 
popularized by the plaintiff that her name is identified with it; [and] 
that she is best known by her connection with the song.”  
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that her lawsuit was 
preempted by copyright law. 
 
Oliveria v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2001), addresses a 
slightly different situation.  Oliveria, who performs under the name 
“Astrud Gilberto,” sang the well-known 1964 recording of the song 
“The Girl from Ipanema.”  Frito-Lay obtained the proper copyright 
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licenses to use that recording in a television ad for its baked potato 
chips.  Nevertheless, Oliveria claimed she had become known as the 
Girl from Ipanema due to the recording’s success and her many 
subsequent performances of the song.  The court rejected Oliveria’s 
trademark claim because she did not cite “a single precedent 
throughout the history of trademark supporting the notion that a 
performing artist acquires a trademark or service mark signifying 
herself in a recording of her own famous performance.”  The court 
said that Oliveria’s state law claims could be refiled in state court, 
but Oliveria never did so. 
 
C. A Person’s Image 
 
Visually depicting a person in ad copy is usually squarely covered by 
the person’s publicity/privacy rights.  It might also constitute an 
endorsement or testimonial, which is discussed later in this chapter.  
California’s statute also protects against the use of “likenesses,” 
which probably refers to drawings of people instead of photos or 
videos of them. 
 
To get around this general rule, some advertisers have hired look-
alike actors to portray famous celebrities.  As with the sound-alike 
cases, courts generally have rejected this work-around. 
 
For example, Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985), involved an ad depicting a look-alike of the famous director 
and actor Woody Allen: 
 
The present action arises from an advertisement, placed by 
National to promote its nationally franchised video rental 
chain, containing a photograph of defendant Boroff taken on 
September 2, 1983.  The photograph portrays a customer in a 
National Video store, an individual in his forties, with a high 
forehead, tousled hair, and heavy black glasses.  The 
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customer’s elbow is on the counter, and his face, bearing an 
expression at once quizzical and somewhat smug, is leaning 
on his hand.  It is not disputed that, in general, the physical 
features and pose are characteristic of plaintiff. 
 
The staging of the photograph also evokes associations with 
plaintiff.  Sitting on the counter are videotape cassettes of 
“Annie Hall” and “Bananas,” two of plaintiff’s best known 
films, as well as “Casablanca” and “The Maltese Falcon.”  The 
latter two are Humphrey Bogart films of the 1940’s associated 
with plaintiff primarily because of his play and film “Play It 
Again, Sam,” in which the spirit of Bogart appears to the 
character played by Allen and offers him romantic advice.  In 
addition, the title “Play It Again, Sam” is a famous, although 
inaccurate, quotation from “Casablanca.” 
 
The individual in the advertisement is holding up a National 
Video V.I.P. Card, which apparently entitles the bearer to 
favorable terms on movie rentals.  The woman behind the 
counter is smiling at the customer and appears to be gasping 
in exaggerated excitement at the presence of a celebrity. 
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The photograph was used in an advertisement which 
appeared in the March 1984 issue of “Video Review,” a 
magazine published in New York and distributed in the 
Southern District, and in the April 1984 issue of “Take One,” 
an in-house publication which National distributes to its 
franchisees across the country.  The headline on the 
advertisement reads “Become a V.I.P. at National Video.  
We’ll Make You Feel Like a Star.”  The copy goes on to 
explain that holders of the V.I.P. card receive “hassle-free 
movie renting” and “special savings” and concludes that “you 
don’t need a famous face to be treated to some pretty famous 
service.” 
 
The same photograph and headline were also used on 
countercards distributed to National’s franchisees.  Although 
the advertisement that ran in “Video Review” contained a 
disclaimer in small print reading “Celebrity double provided 
by Ron Smith’s Celebrity Look-Alike’s, Los Angeles, Calif.,” no 
such disclaimer appeared in the other versions of the 
advertisement. 
 
The defendants explained the look-alike’s appearance in the ad copy 
this way: 
 
Although defendants concede that they sought to evoke by 
reference plaintiff’s general persona, they strenuously deny 
that they intended to imply that the person in the photograph 
was actually plaintiff or that plaintiff endorsed National.  
Defendants offer their own interpretation of the 
advertisement to support their assertion that the photograph 
does not depict plaintiff.  According to defendants, the idea of 
the advertisement is that even people who are not stars are 
treated like stars at National Video.  They insist that the 
advertisement depicts a “Woody Allen fan,” so dedicated that 
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he has adopted his idol’s appearance and mannerisms, who is 
able to live out his fantasy by receiving star treatment at 
National Video.  The knowing viewer is supposed to be 
amused that the counter person actually believes that the 
customer is Woody Allen. 
 
Do you find that explanation credible? 
 
Allen ultimately succeeded on his trademark claim of likely confusion 
over endorsement, and the court did not definitively resolve his 
publicity/privacy rights claims because the New York statute covered 
only a portrait or picture, and the court was unsure that a look-alike 
could count as a portrait or picture.  However, the court’s discussion 
of those claims is nevertheless useful: 
 
The beginning of modern privacy law is generally charted 
from the publication of the famous Warren and [Brandeis] 
article, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  
Although most states, in the decades since, have recognized at 
least four different categories of invasion of privacy, New 
York has never recognized the right to privacy as part of its 
common law.  Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 
433, 439–40 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983). 
 
Arrington reaffirms the rule first established in Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).  
The New York Court of Appeals therein rejected an 
argument, based on the Warren and Brandeis article, that 
New York should recognize the branch of privacy law which 
has come to be known as misappropriation of another’s name 
or likeness.  Plaintiff Roberson sought to recover for the 
humiliation she felt when she discovered that some 25,000 
copies of her portrait had been distributed throughout the 
country without her consent as part of an advertisement for 
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flour.  The court held that no precedent supported plaintiff’s 
argument, that recognition of such a common law right would 
result in endless litigation, and that only the legislature could 
create this new right. 
 
In response to public outcry over the outcome of Roberson, the 
New York legislature passed sections 50 and 51 of the Civil 
Rights Law in 1903.  In its present form the statute provides 
that 
 
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising 
purposes, or for purposes of trade, the name, portrait 
or picture of any living person without having first 
obtained the written consent of such person, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor. 
 
Section 51 provides in addition that 
 
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used 
within the state for advertising purposes or for 
purposes of trade without the written consent first 
obtained as above provided may maintain an 
equitable action in the supreme court of this state 
against the person, firm or corporation so using his 
name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the 
use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages 
for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if 
defendant shall have knowingly used such person’s 
name, portrait or picture in such a manner as is 
forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last 
section, the jury, in its discretion, may award 
exemplary damages. . . . 
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The right to privacy recognized by the Civil Rights law has 
been strictly construed, both because it is in derogation of 
New York common law and because of potential conflict with 
the First Amendment, particularly where public figures are 
involved.  To make out a violation, a plaintiff must satisfy 
three distinct elements: 1) use of his or her name, portrait, or 
picture, 2) for commercial or trade purposes, 3) without 
written permission.  Merely suggesting certain characteristics 
of the plaintiff, without literally using his or her name, 
portrait, or picture, is not actionable under the statute.  
Plaintiff here must therefore demonstrate, inter alia, that the 
advertisement in question appropriates his “portrait or 
picture.” 
 
In addition to the statutory right to privacy, plaintiff in this 
case argues that defendants have violated his “right of 
publicity,” an analogous right recognized in the common law 
of many jurisdictions.  Indeed, until recently, some federal 
courts assumed that the New York courts would recognize 
such a common law right independent of that protected by the 
Civil Rights Law.  The elements of the cause of action were 
deemed to be essentially the same as those provided in the 
privacy statute, with the additional requirement that the 
plaintiff have developed a property interest with a monetary 
value in his or her name or face.  Unlike the Civil Rights Law 
provision, which is primarily designed to compensate for the 
hurt feelings of private people who find their identities 
usurped for another’s commercial gain, the right of publicity 
protects this property interest of the celebrity in his or her 
public identity.  It is primarily this interest which Woody 
Allen seeks to vindicate in the case at bar. 
 
The New York Court of Appeals, however, recently has held 
that no separate common law cause of action to vindicate the 
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right of publicity exists in New York.  Stephano v. News 
Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (1984).  The court 
held, in essence, that the “right of publicity” was merely a 
misnomer for the privacy interest protected by the Civil 
Rights Law, as applied to public figures. 
 
By its terms, the statute applies to any use of a 
person’s picture or portrait for advertising or trade 
purposes whenever the defendant has not obtained 
the person’s written consent to do so. . . . Since the 
“right of publicity” is encompassed under the Civil 
Rights Law as an aspect of the right of privacy, which, 
as noted, is exclusively statutory in this state, the 
plaintiff cannot claim an independent common law 
right of publicity. . . . 
 
. . . In examining the undisputed facts of this case with 
reference to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, it is 
immediately clear that two of the three prongs of the Civil 
Rights Law are satisfied.  First, there is no question that the 
photograph said to be of plaintiff was used for commercial 
purposes, since it appeared in a magazine advertisement 
soliciting business for National Video franchisees.  Second, 
defendants do not dispute that plaintiff never gave his 
consent to the use of the photograph, either orally or in 
writing.  It therefore appears that the only element of 
plaintiff’s case over which there is any serious dispute is 
whether the photograph is a “portrait or picture” of plaintiff. 
 
Plaintiff argues that Boroff’s physical resemblance to him, 
when viewed in conjunction with the undeniable attempt to 
evoke plaintiff’s image through the selection of props and 
poses, makes the photograph in question a “portrait or 
picture” of plaintiff as a matter of law.  Plaintiff notes that it 
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is not necessary that all persons seeing the photograph 
actually identify him, only that he be identifiable from the 
photograph.  Plaintiff contends that it is beyond cavil that 
some people will recognize him in this photograph.  The cited 
cases, however, involved photographs which were not 
disputed to be of the plaintiffs; the only question was whether 
the pictures were too old or too obscure to be recognizable.  
They do not help us answer the more basic question of 
whether the photograph in the case at bar is, in fact, a 
“picture” or “portrait” of plaintiff. 
 
More helpful are a line of cases holding that any recognizable 
likeness, not just an actual photograph, may qualify as a 
“portrait or picture.” . . .  
 
Therefore, if defendants had used, for example, a clearly 
recognizable painting or cartoon of plaintiff, it would certainly 
constitute a “portrait or picture” within the meaning of the 
statute.  The case of a look-alike, however, is more 
problematic.  A painting, drawing or manikin [sic] has no 
existence other than as a representation of something or 
someone; if the subject is recognizable, then the work is a 
“portrait.”  Defendant Boroff, however, is not a manikin [sic].  
He is a person with a right to his own identity and his own 
face.  Plaintiff’s privacy claim therefore requires the court to 
answer the almost metaphysical question of when one 
person’s face, presented in a certain context, becomes, as a 
matter of law, the face of another. 
 
This question is not merely theoretical.  The use in an 
advertisement of a drawing, which has no other purpose than 
to represent its subject, must give rise to a cause of action 
under the Civil Rights Law, because it raises the obvious 
implication that its subject has endorsed or is otherwise 
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involved with the product being advertised.  There is no 
question that this amounts to an appropriation of another’s 
likeness for commercial advantage. 
 
A living and breathing actor, however, has the right to exploit 
his or her own face for commercial gain.  This right is itself 
protected by the Civil Rights Law.  The privacy law does not 
prohibit one from evoking certain aspects of another’s 
personality, but it does prohibit one from actually 
representing oneself as another person.  The look-alike 
situation falls somewhere in between and therefore presents a 
difficult question. 
 
As you can see, New York’s approaches to publicity and privacy rights 
are both simpler and more complex than California’s.  California has 
overlapping statutory and common law publicity rights, while New 
York has only statutory privacy rights. 
 
A more decisive New York look-alike case is Onassis v. Christian 
Dior, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), which involved ad copy 
that included a look-alike of former First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy 
Onassis.  The court harshly condemned the defendants: 
 
We are dealing here with actuality and appearance, where 
illusion often heightens reality and all is not quite what it 
seems.  Is the illusionist to be free to step aside, having 
reaped the benefits of his creation, and permitted to disclaim 
the very impression he sought to create?  If we were to permit 
it, we would be sanctioning an obvious loophole to evade the 
statute.  If a person is unwilling to give his or her 
endorsement to help sell a product, either at an offered price 
or at any price, no matter—hire a double and the same effect 
is achieved.  The essential purpose of the statute must be 
carried out by giving it a common sense reading which bars 
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easy evasion.  If we truly value the right of privacy in a world 
of exploitation, where every mark of distinctiveness becomes 
grist for the mills of publicity, then we must give it more than 
lip service and grudging recognition.  Let the word go forth—
there is no free ride.  The commercial hitchhiker seeking to 
travel on the fame of another will have to learn to pay the 
fare or stand on his own two feet. 
 
 
 
Like the Allen court, the judge recognized the need to balance the 
look-alike’s own privacy interests, but the court did not demonstrate 
much sympathy for her plight: 
 
To paint a portrait of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis is to create 
a work of art; to look like Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis is not.  
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Miss Reynolds may capitalize on the striking resemblance of 
facial features at parties, TV appearances, and dramatic 
works, but not in commercial advertisements.  Similarly, 
defendant Ron Smith Celebrity Look-Alikes can market its 
clients for fun and profit in various areas, but may not 
capitalize on natural resemblance to a well-known person for 
trade or advertising.  No one has an inherent or constitutional 
right to pass himself off for what he is not. 
 
Another way that advertisers might try to work around the general 
prohibition against depicting people in ads is by showing only a 
seemingly unidentifiable portion of the person.  For example, the 
following case addresses ad copy where the people’s faces were not 
shown. 
 
Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, 63 N.Y.2d 379 (N.Y. 1984) 
 
Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to section 51 of the Civil Rights 
Law seeking damages from defendants for publishing photographs of 
them for advertising purposes.  It is conceded for purposes of this 
appeal that plaintiffs are the persons shown in the photographs and 
that defendants used the photographs as claimed without their 
consent.  The legal issue submitted is whether a photograph of the 
nude plaintiffs, mother and child, which shows their bodies full 
length as viewed from a position behind and to the right of them, and 
which does not show their faces, reveals sufficiently identifiable 
likenesses to withstand defendants’ motions for summary judgment.  
We hold that it does. 
 
The action arises from these facts. 
 
On the July 4th weekend in 1977, plaintiffs were visiting friends in 
Woodstock, New York, and Susan Cohen and her four-year-old 
daughter, Samantha, went bathing in a stream located on their 
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friends’ private property.  Without their consent, defendant James 
Krieger took photographs of plaintiffs and subsequently sold them to 
defendant Herbal Concepts, Inc., a seller and advertiser of consumer 
products.  Herbal Concepts used one of the photographs in an 
advertisement for Au Naturel, a product designed to help women 
eliminate body cellulite, those “fatty lumps and bumps that won’t go 
away.”  The advertisement appeared in two editions of House and 
Garden, which is published by defendant Condé Nast Publications, 
Inc., and in single editions of House Beautiful and Cosmopolitan, 
which are published by defendant Hearst Corporation.  Ira Cohen 
subsequently recognized his wife and daughter in the advertisements 
while reading one of the magazines and this action followed. . . . 
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. . . [I]n New York privacy claims are founded solely upon sections 50 
and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.  The statute protects against the 
appropriation of a plaintiff’s name or likeness for defendants’ benefit.  
Thus, it creates a cause of action in favor of “[a]ny person whose 
name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising 
purposes or for the purposes of trade without . . . written consent.”  
The action may be brought to enjoin the prohibited use and may also 
seek damages for any injuries sustained including exemplary 
damages for a knowing violation of the statute.  We are concerned in 
this case with the appropriation of plaintiffs’ likenesses.  Defendants 
claim that there has been no wrong because even if the photograph 
depicts plaintiffs, they are not identifiable from it. 
 
The statute is designed to protect a person’s identity, not merely a 
property interest in his or her “name”, “portrait” or “picture”, and 
thus it implicitly requires that plaintiff be capable of identification 
from the objectionable material itself.  That is not to say that the 
action may only be maintained when plaintiff’s face is visible in the 
advertising copy.  Presumably, by using the term “portrait” the 
Legislature intended a representation which includes a facial 
reproduction, either artistically or by photograph, but if we are to 
give effect to all parts of the statute, it applies also to the improper 
use of a “picture” of plaintiff which does not show the face.  
Manifestly, there can be no appropriation of plaintiff’s identity for 
commercial purposes if he or she is not recognizable from the picture 
and a privacy action could not be sustained, for example, because of 
the nonconsensual use of a photograph of a hand or a foot without 
identifying features.  But assuming that the photograph depicts 
plaintiff, whether it presents a recognizable likeness is generally a 
jury question unless plaintiff cannot be identified because of the 
limited subject matter revealed in the photograph or the quality of 
the image.  Before a jury may be permitted to decide the issue, to 
survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must satisfy the 
court that the person in the photograph is capable of being identified 
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from the advertisement alone and that plaintiff has been so 
identified. 
 
The sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence for purposes of the motion will 
necessarily depend upon the court’s determination of the quality and 
quantity of the identifiable characteristics displayed in the 
advertisement and this will require an assessment of the clarity of 
the photograph, the extent to which identifying features are visible, 
and the distinctiveness of those features.  This picture depicts two 
nude persons, a woman and a child, standing in water a few inches 
deep.  The picture quality is good and there are no obstructions to 
block the view of the subjects.  The woman is carrying a small 
unidentified object in her left hand and is leading the child with her 
right hand.  Neither person’s face is visible but the backs and right 
sides of both mother and child are clearly presented and the mother’s 
right breast can be seen.  The identifying features of the subjects 
include their hair, bone structure, body contours and stature and 
their posture.  Considering these factors, we conclude that a jury 
could find that someone familiar with the persons in the photograph 
could identify them by looking at the advertisement.  Although we do 
not rely on the fact, it is also reasonable to assume that just as 
something in the advertising copy may aid recognition, identifiability 
may be enhanced also in photograph depicting two persons because 
observers may associate the two and thus more easily identify them 
when they are seen together. 
 
The plaintiffs also submitted evidence that they were identified as 
the persons in defendants’ advertisement by Ira Cohen’s affidavit in 
which he stated that while leafing through one of defendants’ 
magazines he “recognized [his] wife and daughter immediately.”  
That was prima facie sufficient. 
 
Defendants contend Mr. Cohen’s affidavit is not probative on the 
issue of identification because he was present when the photograph 
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was taken, as indeed he was.  He was not only present, he was 
incensed by the photographer’s intrusion and chased him away.  
Essentially, defendants’ contention is that Mr. Cohen’s identification 
is tainted by this independent knowledge that plaintiffs were 
photographed by defendant Krieger while bathing.  Although Mr. 
Cohen’s presence when the photograph was taken may have 
increased his ability to identify his wife and child, the motion court or 
the jury at trial could conclude that he also recognized them from the 
photograph and his presence when it was taken, standing alone, does 
not disqualify him from offering evidence that he did so. . . . 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Other Causes of Action?  Could the Cohens have sued the 
photographer for harassment or public disclosure of private facts 
(discussed in Chapter 14)?  Would the property owner have a claim 
against the photographer for trespass?  Could the advertisers be 
secondarily liable for that trespass?  See the Burgess case discussed 
in Chapter 16 as well as California Civil Code § 1708.08 (colloquially 
referred to as the “California anti-paparazzi statute”), which says in 
part: 
 
(a) A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the 
defendant knowingly enters onto the land of another person 
without permission or otherwise committed a trespass in 
order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff with the 
intent to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or 
other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a 
personal or familial activity and the physical invasion occurs 
in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person . . . 
 
(f) (1) The transmission, publication, broadcast, sale, offer for 
sale, or other use of any visual image, sound recording, or 
other physical impression that was taken or captured in 
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violation of subdivision (a) . . . shall not constitute a violation 
of this section unless the person, in the first transaction 
following the taking or capture of the visual image, sound 
recording, or other physical impression, publicly transmitted, 
published, broadcast, sold or offered for sale, the visual image, 
sound recording, or other physical impression with actual 
knowledge that it was taken or captured in violation of 
subdivision (a) . . . and provide compensation, consideration, 
or remuneration, monetary or otherwise, for the rights to the 
unlawfully obtained visual image, sound recording, or other 
physical impression. 
 
Under a statute like this, could Herbal Concepts have been liable for 
buying the photos from Krieger?  How would this statute fare in a 
constitutional challenge? 
 
Recreating the Photo.  If the advertiser and photographer liked the 
scene so much, would there be any restrictions on them recreating the 
scene with paid models? 
 
Identifiability.  Has the identifiability of people gone up over time?  
For example, many people now have distinctive tattoos, and 
automatic facial recognition technology continues to improve.  
Furthermore, it has become fairly common for a seemingly obscure 
person in a photograph to become uniquely identified when seen by 
millions of Internet users.  See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas 
Escalates into Test of the Internet’s Power to Shame, WASH. POST, July 
7, 2005 (discussing the naming and shaming of the South Korean 
“dog poop girl”).  More generally, the segregation of information into 
“personally identifiable” (like a face) and “non-personally identifiable” 
(like a photo of a person’s back) may be a technological and legal 
fiction.  Cf. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). 
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One possible inference is that it may be impossible to use an 
unconsented photograph of a person in ad copy, even if his or her face 
isn’t shown, because anyone in ad copy can become personally 
identifiable if enough people see the photo; inevitably, someone will 
personally know the individual and be able to connect the identity.  In 
the Cohen case, recall the only person who could identify the depicted 
individuals definitively was the husband, who was at the scene. 
 
Identifiability When the Person Isn’t Shown at All.  Because the 
photos depicted the individuals’ backside, the Cohen case involves 
somewhat attenuated identifiability.  But just how far can we push 
the identifiability concept?  Could a person be visually identified if 
you couldn’t see the person at all? 
 
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 
1974) involved the following facts: 
 
Plaintiff Motschenbacher is a professional driver of racing 
cars, internationally known and recognized in racing circles 
and by racing fans.  He derives part of his income from 
manufacturers of commercial products who pay him for 
endorsing their products. 
 
During the relevant time span, plaintiff has consistently 
“individualized” his cars to set them apart from those of other 
drivers and to make them more readily identifiable as his 
own.  Since 1966, each of his cars has displayed a distinctive 
narrow white pinstripe appearing on no other car.  This 
decoration has adorned the leading edges of the cars’ bodies, 
which have uniformly been solid red.  In addition, the white 
background for his racing number “11” has always been oval, 
in contrast to the circular backgrounds of all other cars. 
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In 1970, defendants, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and 
William Esty Company, produced and caused to be televised a 
commercial which utilized a “stock” color photograph 
depicting several racing cars on a racetrack.  Plaintiff’s car 
appears in the foregound [sic], and although plaintiff is the 
driver, his facial features are not visible. 
 
In producing the commercial, defendants altered the 
photograph: they changed the numbers on all racing cars 
depicted, transforming plaintiff’s number “11” into “71”; they 
“attached” a wing-like device known as a “spoiler” to 
plaintiff’s car; they added the word “Winston,” the name of 
their product, to that spoiler and removed advertisements for 
other products from the spoilers of other cars.  However, they 
made no other changes, and the white pinstriping, the oval 
medallion, and the red color of plaintiff’s car were retained.  
They then made a motion picture from the altered 
photograph, adding a series of comic strip-type “balloons” 
containing written messages of an advertising nature; one 
such balloon message, appearing to emanate from plaintiff, 
was: “Did you know that Winston tastes good, like a cigarette 
should?”  They also added a sound track consisting in part of 
voices coordinated with, and echoing, the written messages.  
The commercial was subsequently broadcast nationally on 
network television and in color. 
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[screenshot from the ad  
Motschenbacher car depicted in the lower left] 
 
Several of plaintiff’s affiants who had seen the commercial on 
television had immediately recognized plaintiff’s car and had 
inferred that it was sponsored by Winston cigarettes. 
 
On the question of identifiability, the court concluded: 
 
[T]he “likeness” of plaintiff is itself unrecognizable; however, 
the [district] court’s further conclusion of law to the effect that 
the driver is not identifiable as plaintiff is erroneous in that it 
wholly fails to attribute proper significance to the distinctive 
decorations appearing on the car.  As pointed out earlier, 
these markings were not only peculiar to the plaintiff’s cars 
but they caused some persons to think the car in question was 
plaintiff’s and to infer that the person driving the car was the 
plaintiff. 
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As a result, the court said that Motschenbacher stated a cause of 
action for a publicity/privacy rights violation.  In effect, the court said 
that even though viewers could not see Motschenbacher personally, 
his rights were nevertheless violated because his uniquely 
identifiable car was depicted.  Thus, publicity/privacy rights can 
extend much further than simply protecting depictions of people. 
 
Scope of Consent.  Advertisers can run into trouble even when they 
get consent from the depicted individual.  Consider the following ad 
for a law firm: 
 
 
 
The depicted firefighter, Robert Keiley, joined the FDNY in 2004—
three years after 9/11.  Therefore, he was not “there.”  Keiley signed a 
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broad publicity consent, but he says he thought that his depiction 
would be used in a fire prevention ad and the 9/11 picture was 
photoshopped into his hands.  See Reuven Fenton & Jennifer 
Fermino, Law Firm’s Ad Trick a 9/11 ‘Insult,’ N.Y. POST, March 28, 
2011.  Did the law firm or its ad agency do anything wrong? 
 
Labor Union Relations.  Many advertising agencies and some large 
advertisers have signed agreements with actors’ labor unions, such as 
the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the American Federation of 
Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA).  Each agreement should be 
reviewed carefully, but in general they (1) require that advertisers 
use only union members as actors in advertisements (with some 
exceptions, such as showing a company employee doing his or her 
normal job), and (2) specify minimum payments to actors, including 
payments for pensions and health benefits as well as “residuals” 
(ongoing payments for continued use of the ad copy). 
 
D. Evoking a Persona 
 
As we’ve seen, courts apply the publicity/privacy rights doctrines 
quite expansively when ad copy includes any potentially identifiable 
part of a person—his or her face, body or voice (even a sound-alike).  
But what if ad copy incorporates none of these personal attributes, 
and no one would think that a celebrity actually appeared in the ad 
(as viewers might have in Motsenbacher), and yet a celebrity persona 
is still identifiable?  As the next case indicates, publicity rights can be 
stretched to cover that situation too. 
 
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th 
Cir. 1993) 
 
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting from a request for an en banc 
rehearing. 
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. . . The panel’s opinion is a classic case of overprotection.  Concerned 
about what it sees as a wrong done to Vanna White, the panel 
majority erects a property right of remarkable and dangerous 
breadth: Under the majority’s opinion, it’s now a tort for advertisers 
to remind the public of a celebrity.  Not to use a celebrity’s name, 
voice, signature or likeness; not to imply the celebrity endorses a 
product; but simply to evoke the celebrity’s image in the public’s 
mind.  This Orwellian notion withdraws far more from the public 
domain than prudence and common sense allow.  It conflicts with the 
Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause.  It raises serious First 
Amendment problems.  It’s bad law, and it deserves a long, hard 
second look. 
 
II 
 
Samsung ran an ad campaign promoting its consumer electronics.  
Each ad depicted a Samsung product and a humorous prediction: One 
showed a raw steak with the caption “Revealed to be health food.  
2010 A.D.”  Another showed Morton Downey, Jr. in front of an 
American flag with the caption “Presidential candidate.  2008 A.D.”  
The ads were meant to convey—humorously—that Samsung products 
would still be in use twenty years from now. 
 
The ad that spawned this litigation starred a robot dressed in a wig, 
gown and jewelry reminiscent of Vanna White’s hair and dress; the 
robot was posed next to a Wheel-of-Fortune-like game board.  The 
caption read “Longest-running game show.  2012 A.D.”  The gag here, 
I take it, was that Samsung would still be around when White had 
been replaced by a robot.*  
                                                          
* [Editor’s note: As of 2014, Vanna White still works on Wheel of Fortune, a 
position she has held since 1982, though she actually stopped physically 
turning letters in 1997.  For what it’s worth, steak became a central part of 
the Atkins Diet fad in the early 2000s, and although Morton Downey Jr. did 
not run for president in 2008, actor Fred Thompson did, and many other 
actors have won high office, including Ronald Reagan (president), Al Franken 
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(U.S. senator from Massachusetts), Jesse Ventura (Minnesota governor) and 
Arnold Schwarzenegger (California governor).] 
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[picture of Vanna White next to close-up of Samsung ad] 
 
Perhaps failing to see the humor, White sued, alleging Samsung 
infringed her right of publicity by “appropriating” her “identity.”  
Under California law, White has the exclusive right to use her name, 
likeness, signature and voice for commercial purposes.  But Samsung 
didn’t use her name, voice or signature, and it certainly didn’t use her 
likeness.  The ad just wouldn’t have been funny had it depicted White 
or someone who resembled her—the whole joke was that the game 
show host(ess) was a robot, not a real person.  No one seeing the ad 
could have thought this was supposed to be White in 2012. 
 
The district judge quite reasonably held that, because Samsung didn’t 
use White’s name, likeness, voice or signature, it didn’t violate her 
right of publicity.  Not so, says the panel majority: The California 
right of publicity can’t possibly be limited to name and likeness.  If it 
were, the majority reasons, a “clever advertising strategist” could 
avoid using White’s name or likeness but nevertheless remind people 
of her with impunity, “effectively eviscerat[ing]” her rights.  To 
prevent this “evisceration,” the panel majority holds that the right of 
publicity must extend beyond name and likeness, to any 
“appropriation” of White’s “identity”—anything that “evoke[s]” her 
personality.  
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III 
 
But what does “evisceration” mean in intellectual property law?  
Intellectual property rights aren’t like some constitutional rights, 
absolute guarantees protected against all kinds of interference, subtle 
as well as blatant.  They cast no penumbras, emit no emanations: The 
very point of intellectual property laws is that they protect only 
against certain specific kinds of appropriation.  I can’t publish 
unauthorized copies of, say, Presumed Innocent; I can’t make a movie 
out of it.  But I’m perfectly free to write a book about an idealistic 
young prosecutor on trial for a crime he didn’t commit.  So what if I 
got the idea from Presumed Innocent?  So what if it reminds readers 
of the original?  Have I “eviscerated” Scott Turow’s intellectual 
property rights?  Certainly not.  All creators draw in part on the work 
of those who came before, referring to it, building on it, poking fun at 
it; we call this creativity, not piracy. 
 
The majority isn’t, in fact, preventing the “evisceration” of Vanna 
White’s existing rights; it’s creating a new and much broader property 
right, a right unknown in California law.  It’s replacing the existing 
balance between the interests of the celebrity and those of the public 
by a different balance, one substantially more favorable to the 
celebrity.  Instead of having an exclusive right in her name, likeness, 
signature or voice, every famous person now has an exclusive right to 
anything that reminds the viewer of her.  After all, that’s all 
Samsung did: It used an inanimate object to remind people of White, 
to “evoke [her identity].” 
 
Consider how sweeping this new right is.  What is it about the ad 
that makes people think of White?  It’s not the robot’s wig, clothes or 
jewelry; there must be ten million blond women (many of them quasi-
famous) who wear dresses and jewelry like White’s.  It’s that the 
robot is posed near the “Wheel of Fortune” game board.  Remove the 
game board from the ad, and no one would think of Vanna White.  
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But once you include the game board, anybody standing beside it—a 
brunette woman, a man wearing women’s clothes, a monkey in a wig 
and gown—would evoke White’s image, precisely the way the robot 
did.  It’s the “Wheel of Fortune” set, not the robot’s face or dress or 
jewelry that evokes White’s image.  The panel is giving White an 
exclusive right not in what she looks like or who she is, but in what 
she does for a living . . . 
 
The intellectual property right created by the panel here has [no] 
essential limitations: No fair use exception; no right to parody; no 
idea-expression dichotomy.  It impoverishes the public domain, to the 
detriment of future creators and the public at large.  Instead of well-
defined, limited characteristics such as name, likeness or voice, 
advertisers will now have to cope with vague claims of “appropriation 
of identity,” claims often made by people with a wholly exaggerated 
sense of their own fame and significance.  Future Vanna Whites 
might not get the chance to create their personae, because their 
employers may fear some celebrity will claim the persona is too 
similar to her own.  The public will be robbed of parodies of 
celebrities, and our culture will be deprived of the valuable safety 
valve that parody and mockery create. 
 
Moreover, consider the moral dimension, about which the panel 
majority seems to have gotten so exercised.  Saying Samsung 
“appropriated” something of White’s begs the question: Should White 
have the exclusive right to something as broad and amorphous as her 
“identity”?  Samsung’s ad didn’t simply copy White’s schtick—like all 
parody, it created something new.  True, Samsung did it to make 
money, but White does whatever she does to make money, too; the 
majority talks of “the difference between fun and profit,” but in the 
entertainment industry fun is profit.  Why is Vanna White’s right to 
exclusive for-profit use of her persona—a persona that might not even 
be her own creation, but that of a writer, director or producer—
superior to Samsung’s right to profit by creating its own inventions?  
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Why should she have such absolute rights to control the conduct of 
others, unlimited by the idea-expression dichotomy or by the fair use 
doctrine? . . .  
 
VI 
 
Finally, I can’t see how giving White the power to keep others from 
evoking her image in the public’s mind can be squared with the First 
Amendment.  Where does White get this right to control our 
thoughts?  The majority’s creation goes way beyond the protection 
given a trademark or a copyrighted work, or a person’s name or 
likeness.  All those things control one particular way of expressing an 
idea, one way of referring to an object or a person.  But not allowing 
any means of reminding people of someone?  That’s a speech 
restriction unparalleled in First Amendment law. . . . 
 
The majority dismisses the First Amendment issue out of hand 
because Samsung’s ad was commercial speech.  So what?  
Commercial speech may be less protected by the First Amendment 
than noncommercial speech, but less protected means protected 
nonetheless.  And there are very good reasons for this.  Commercial 
speech has a profound effect on our culture and our attitudes.  
Neutral-seeming ads influence people’s social and political attitudes, 
and themselves arouse political controversy.  “Where’s the Beef?” 
turned from an advertising catchphrase into the only really 
memorable thing about the 1984 presidential campaign.  Four years 
later, Michael Dukakis called George Bush “the Joe Isuzu of 
American politics.” 
 
In our pop culture, where salesmanship must be entertaining and 
entertainment must sell, the line between the commercial and 
noncommercial has not merely blurred; it has disappeared.  Is the 
Samsung parody any different from a parody on Saturday Night Live 
or in Spy Magazine?  Both are equally profit-motivated.  Both use a 
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celebrity’s identity to sell things—one to sell VCRs, the other to sell 
advertising.  Both mock their subjects.  Both try to make people 
laugh.  Both add something, perhaps something worthwhile and 
memorable, perhaps not, to our culture.  Both are things that the 
people being portrayed might dearly want to suppress. 
 
Commercial speech is a significant, valuable part of our national 
discourse.  The Supreme Court has recognized as much, and has 
insisted that lower courts carefully scrutinize commercial speech 
restrictions, but the panel totally fails to do this. . . . 
 
VII 
 
For better or worse, we are the Court of Appeals for the Hollywood 
Circuit.  Millions of people toil in the shadow of the law we make, and 
much of their livelihood is made possible by the existence of 
intellectual property rights.  But much of their livelihood—and much 
of the vibrancy of our culture—also depends on the existence of other 
intangible rights: The right to draw ideas from a rich and varied 
public domain, and the right to mock, for profit as well as fun, the 
cultural icons of our time. 
 
In the name of avoiding the “evisceration” of a celebrity’s rights in her 
image, the majority diminishes the rights of copyright holders and 
the public at large.  In the name of fostering creativity, the majority 
suppresses it.  Vanna White and those like her have been given 
something they never had before, and they’ve been given it at our 
expense.  I cannot agree. 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Denouement.  White ultimately won $403,000 in damages in the case. 
 
Who Owns the Right?  Let’s assume that Samsung did, in fact, 
tortiously evoke White’s role in its ads.  Who is the proper plaintiff—
White, the Wheel of Fortune producers, both, or neither? 
 
In Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999), 
Judge Kozinski again dissented from the denial of an en banc 
hearing.  He summarized the case: 
 
Robots again.  In White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 
1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), we held that the right of publicity 
extends not just to the name, likeness, voice and signature of 
a famous person, but to anything at all that evokes that 
person’s identity.  The plaintiff there was Vanna White, 
Wheel of Fortune letter-turner extraordinaire; the offending 
robot stood next to a letter board, decked out in a blonde wig, 
Vanna-style gown and garish jewelry.  Dissenting from our 
failure to take the case en banc, I argued that our broad 
application of the right of publicity put state law on a collision 
course with the federal rights of the copyright holder. 
 
The conflict in White was hypothetical, since the defendant 
(Samsung) did not have a license from the Wheel of Fortune 
copyright holder.  Here it is concrete: The panel holds that 
licensed animatronic figures based on the copyrighted Cheers 
characters Norm and Cliff infringe on the rights of the actors 
who portrayed them.  As I predicted, White’s voracious logic 
swallows up rights conferred by Congress under the 
Copyright Act. 
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Though a bit dated now, Cheers remains near and dear to the 
hearts of many TV viewers.  Set in a friendly neighborhood 
bar in Boston, the show revolved around a familiar scene.  
Sam, the owner and bartender, entertained the boys with 
tales of his glory days pitching for the Red Sox.  Coach piped 
in with sincere, obtuse advice.  Diane and Frasier chattered 
self-importantly about Lord Byron.  Carla terrorized patrons 
with acerbic comments.  And there were Norm and Cliff, the 
two characters at issue here.  Norm, a fat, endearing, oft-
unemployed accountant, parked himself at the corner of the 
bar, where he was joined by Cliff, a dweebish mailman and 
something of a know-it-all windbag.  After eleven years on the 
air, the gang at Cheers became like family to many fans, 
ensuring many more years in syndication. 
 
Defendant Host International decided to tap into this keg of 
goodwill.  After securing a license from Paramount, the 
copyright holder, Host opened a line of Cheers airport bars.  
To help get patrons into a Cheers mood, Host populated the 
bars with animatronic figures resembling Norm and Cliff: 
One is fat; the other is dressed as a mailman.5  
  
                                                          
5 In a half-hearted attempt to avoid litigation, Host changed the robots’ 
names to “Hank” and “Bob.” 
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Plaintiffs George Wendt and John Ratzenberger, the only 
actors who ever portrayed Norm and Cliff, sued Host for 
unfair competition and violation of their right of publicity.  
Paramount intervened, claiming that its copyright preempted 
any claim Wendt and Ratzenberger might have under state 
law.  The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants because it found that the robots didn’t look like 
the plaintiffs: “[T]here is [no] similarity at all . . . except that 
one of the robots, like one of the plaintiffs, is heavier than the 
other. . . . The facial features are totally different.”  Relying on 
White, the panel here reverses but offers little explanation 
beyond the curt assertion that “material facts exist that might 
cause a reasonable jury to find [the robots] sufficiently ‘like’ 
[Wendt and Ratzenberger] to violate” their right of publicity. 
 
After the case was remanded to the district court, the parties settled. 
 
While Wendt is not an advertising law case per se, it does indicate 
that obtaining a copyright license to fictional characters may not be 
enough to use the fictional characters in ad copy.  Where an actor 
may be publicly associated with the character, the actor’s publicity 
rights mean consent also may be necessary.  Ideally, the producers of 
the fictional work obtain permission from the actor to relicense his or 
her publicity rights as part of a copyright license.  Otherwise, 
separate permissions from both the copyright holder and the actor 
may be required. 
 
For more on the White case and its implications for the boundaries of 
publicity rights, see Stacey Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 
B.C. L. REV. 291 (2003).   
 
Under this precedent, if ad copy depicts an empty Cleveland 
Cavaliers jersey with the number 23, has the advertiser violated 
LeBron James’s publicity rights?  (Ignore any trademark issues, and 
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assume this is during the time when LeBron James is a member of 
the Cavaliers’ team). 
 
3. Endorsements and Testimonials 
 
As the previous sections have explored, ads using real people may 
require their consent even if the ad contains nothing untruthful about 
them.  Still, under certain circumstances, consent may be insufficient.   
 
When ad copy depicts a person voicing a fact or opinion, the person’s 
statements might qualify as an endorsement or testimonial.  The 
FTC’s Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials 
in Advertising (16 C.F.R. Part 255), designed to clarify the FTC’s 
Section 5 powers, define an “endorsement” and “testimonial” (the FTC 
equates the two) as: 
 
any advertising message (including verbal statements, 
demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness 
or other identifying personal characteristics of an individual 
or the name or seal of an organization) that consumers are 
likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or 
experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, 
even if the views expressed by that party are identical to 
those of the sponsoring advertiser. 
 
While this definition is not especially clear, it is intended to exclude 
the statements of people that consumers are likely to recognize as 
actors hired by the advertiser.  A paradigmatic endorsement is when 
a celebrity personally vouches for the product’s quality; a 
paradigmatic testimonial is when a person describes his or her 
experiences with the product (such as the amount of weight lost using 
a diet aid) or is depicted in before/after pictures.  Actors playing out 
an obviously fictional or hypothetical scripted scene in an 
advertisement aren’t making endorsements or testimonials.  
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Some of the key portions of the Endorsement and Testimonials 
Guidelines provide that: 
 
• endorsements must reflect the endorser’s actual beliefs or 
experiences 
• endorsers may not make representations that would be 
deceptive if made by the advertiser 
• if the ad copy says an endorser uses the product, that must be 
true 
• if the ad copy represents that the endorser is an expert, the 
endorser must have the requisite qualifications 
• the advertiser must disclose any unexpected connections with 
the endorser that would affect the endorsement’s credibility 
 
Many of these guidelines are not controversial in the abstract.  They 
are logical extensions of general false advertising principles.  
However, specific applications can raise tricky issues.   
 
For example, in the fall of 2009, the FTC amended the guidelines to 
expressly govern online product reviews.  The FTC stated particular 
concern about situations where an advertiser provided some financial 
benefit—such as free product samples—to a blogger to write a blog 
post.  When the advertiser gives the blogger a benefit, even as tiny as 
a free product sample, the FTC believes the blog post becomes a paid 
endorsement or testimonial, so the blogger must prominently disclose 
the payment to avoid misleading the readers about the putative 
authenticity of the blogger’s views. 
 
The FTC’s position creates some awkward line-drawing between 
traditional journalists, who the FTC thinks do not need to disclose 
receiving free product samples if they do so as part of their jobs, and 
identically situated bloggers, who do need to make such disclosures.  
Not only did the FTC have weak justifications for its Internet 
exceptionalism, but the FTC’s position purports to regulate what 
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most people would consider “editorial content” (the blog post), not 
commercial speech or advertising. 
 
New ad contexts are also relevant.  When a celebrity appears in a 
traditional thirty-second ad, her status as paid endorser is obvious to 
consumers.  But what if the celebrity appears on a nighttime talk 
show and casually mentions how much better she’s doing now that 
she’s using a particular weight loss program?  The FTC’s guidelines 
specify that, if it would not be obvious to most consumers that she 
was being paid as a spokesperson by the weight loss program, then 
her casual reference to the weight loss program would be a paid 
endorsement/testimonial—meaning she would need to disclose that 
fact when she drops the casual reference; and, because she is a 
spokesperson, what she says on the talk show is subject to the same 
substantiation requirements as an ordinary ad would be.   
 
In one case, the security company ADT paid three people over 
$300,000 to appear on television shows, including the Today Show 
and local newscasts, and post content online, including on blogs.  
These endorsers were touted as “The Safety Mom,” a home security 
expert, or a tech expert.  They reviewed products including ADT’s 
security system, which they described as “amazing” or “incredible,” 
and touted its capabilities, safety benefits, and cost.  ADT set up 
these interviews through its PR firms and booking agents, providing 
reporters and anchors with suggested interview questions and 
background video.  The experts never disclosed their payments from 
ADT. 
 
The FTC brought an enforcement action against ADT.  The resulting 
consent order prohibited ADT from misrepresenting that any 
discussion or demonstration of its products or services was an 
independent review by an impartial expert, required ADT to clearly 
and prominently disclose any material connections with the experts, 
and required ADT to remove existing reviews and endorsements that 
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had been misrepresented as independent or that failed to disclose a 
material connection.  See In re ADT LLC, FTC File No. 122 3121 
(Mar. 11, 2014). 
 
Why do you think the FTC is concerned with such situations?  
Without this rule, would advertisers be able to disseminate 
unsubstantiated claims, or are there other constraints on advertisers 
that might block abuse of this loophole?  What do reasonable 
consumers expect when they see a celebrity or “expert” touting some 
product or service in an “interview” by a reporter associated with a 
TV station?  If the interviewee makes only vague, general statements, 
would that be puffery?  Even if consumers don’t understand that she’s 
a paid spokesperson, are they harmed if all she does is puff? 
 
Fabricated Endorsements and the David Manning Incident 
 
Sometimes, advertisers simply fabricate endorsements, such as fake 
online consumer reviews touting the advertiser’s offerings or bashing 
rivals’ offerings.  See, e.g., Press Release, New York Office of the 
Attorney General, A.G. Schneiderman Announces Agreement With 19 
Companies To Stop Writing Fake Online Reviews And Pay More 
Than $350,000 In Fines, Sept. 23, 2013 (announcing settlements with 
numerous companies that had written fake consumer reviews for 
themselves on websites such as Yelp, Google Local, and CitySearch). 
 
However, fake endorsements are hardly new.  Sony’s David Manning 
incident provides a useful case study. 
 
For about a year starting in 2000, Sony’s Columbia Pictures ran 
advertisements for several movies containing laudatory comments 
from “David Manning,” identified as a movie reviewer for the 
Ridgefield (Conn.) Press.  While the Ridgefield Press is a real 
newspaper, David Manning was a fictitious person, and the quotes 
attributed to Manning were all fabricated.  Why a Sony employee 
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chose to engage in this artifice is baffling; as one journalist wrote, 
“[t]he shocking part is that practically every movie these days, good 
or bad, garners [a] poster-friendly blurb from some critic—even no-
name hacks toiling for virtually unknown publications.”  Josh 
Grossberg, Sony’s Fake Critic Fallout, E! Online, June 6, 2001. 
 
A Newsweek article on June 2, 2001, exposed Sony’s ruse.  Legal 
proceedings ensued. 
 
Several private consumer class action lawsuits were brought against 
Sony for false advertising, unfair competition and related claims.  
Sony tried to dismiss one such lawsuit on the grounds that its 
advertisements were protected by California’s anti-SLAPP statute, 
which applies to certain types of speech.  In Rezec v. Sony Pictures 
Entertainment, 116 Cal. App. 4th 135 (Cal. App. Ct. 2004), a divided 
California appellate court rejected Sony’s dismissal attempt because 
the ads were commercial speech, which the court said is not protected 
by anti-SLAPP laws. 
 
Sony subsequently settled the class action lawsuit for an announced 
value of $1.5 million, including $500,000 allocated to consumers who 
saw some of the movies advertised using the fake quotes.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, only 170 consumers’ claims—totaling less than 
$5,100—were tendered.  See William Booth, Big Payday for Lawyers 
In Sony Fake-Blurb Deal, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2005.  Sony gave the 
remaining amount to charity. 
 
Several attorneys general also explored actions against Sony.  Sony 
settled with Connecticut’s attorney general for $325,000, plus the 
promise to stop using fake quotes and showing ads depicting 
employees giving enthusiastic fake testimonials (a common practice 
among movie studios at the time). 
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Truthful Endorsements and Consumers Union v. Regina 
 
Although legitimate advertisers like Sony can be caught playing 
around with fake endorsements, it’s more likely you’ll be asked if an 
advertiser can republish a truthful endorsement.  For example, 
assume that a consumer voluntarily publishes a favorable experience 
with the advertiser’s product on the consumer’s blog, or a newspaper 
publishes an interview with a celebrity where the celebrity mentions 
that she enjoys the advertiser’s product (or recall the Katherine Heigl 
situation discussed above, where a photo depicted her carrying a 
Duane Reade bag in public).  The advertiser might wish to republish 
these favorable statements in its ad copy.   
 
Obviously, the advertiser could do so if it procures the person’s 
consent, but is consent required?  As we have seen often, advertisers 
can have difficulty obtaining consent, especially from celebrities.  The 
endorser has already publicly made the favorable statements, so the 
advertiser just wants to disseminate these already-expressed views 
more broadly. 
 
Although republishing unconsented endorsements or testimonials in 
ads may sound innocuous, it is a legally uncertain practice.  The 
multi-year legal battle between the Consumers Union (the publisher 
of Consumer Reports) and Regina (a vacuum manufacturer) 
illustrates some of the legal conundrums posed by the truthful 
republication of an endorsement.  See Consumers Union of United 
States, Inc. v. The New Regina Corp., 664 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987).  The court describes the background: 
 
The July 1983 issue of Consumer Reports contained an article 
that evaluated and compared eighteen different models of 
lightweight vacuum cleaners.  Defendant Regina 
manufactured four of the models tested.  The article judged 
Regina’s Elictrikbroom Powerteam HB 6910 (“Powerteam 
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6910”) to be the best of all models tested.  CU check-rated the 
model, signifying that the model was of high quality and 
appreciably superior to the other models that had not been 
check-rated.  CU rated the three other Regina models from 
fair to poor. 
 
On June 28, 1983, counsel for Regina requested permission 
from Consumers Union to quote the favorable evaluation of 
the Powerteam 6910 in an advertising campaign.  Through 
counsel, CU denied permission.  Sometime between July and 
September, 1983, Regina hired Grey Advertising to create a 
series of television commercials for the Powerteam 6910.  Two 
of the commercials were eventually broadcast on network 
television.  On September 27, 1983, Regina notified 
Consumers Union that it had begun airing the television 
commercials which quoted verbatim from the evaluation of 
the Powerteam 6910.  The first commercial, entitled “Squid,” 
featured a voice over announcer who states that the 
Powerteam 6910 is “the only lightweight that Consumer 
Reports says was an adequate substitute for a full size 
vacuum.”  While the announcer is speaking, a disclaimer 
appears on the screen noting that “Consumer Reports is not 
affiliated with Regina and does not endorse products.”  The 
second commercial, entitled “Consumer Reports,” includes 
several verbatim quotations from the evaluation of the 
Powerteam 6910.  [The four quotes: (1) And Consumer 
Reports states, “Regina Powerteam—far ahead of the pack in 
cleaning ability.”  (2) Of all the lightweights tested “only one 
worked well.”  (3) On medium pile carpeting Powerteam “did 
the job with the least effort.”  (4) In fact, it’s the only one 
Consumer Reports calls an “adequate substitute for a full-
sized vacuum.”]  These quotations flash on the screen as the 
announcer reads them.  Each time the announcer mentions 
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Consumer Reports, the same disclaimer used in Squid 
appears on the screen. 
 
 
 
After viewing the commercials, CU demanded that Regina 
withdraw them immediately.  Regina refused.  The company 
did, however, alter the disclaimer to read that “Consumer 
Reports is not affiliated with Regina and does not endorse 
Regina products or any other products.”  
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On the surface, the legal problems may be hard to see.  Regina used, 
at most, five short quotations, attributed its source (as, indeed, it may 
be required to do), and disclaimed any affiliation with the source. 
 
Perhaps some of the problem lies with the unique nature of 
Consumers Union and Consumer Reports.  The court describes: 
 
CU is a New York not-for-profit corporation organized in 
1936.  CU’s primary purpose is independently to test 
consumer products and to publish the test results and 
evaluations in its monthly magazine Consumer Reports.  
Circulation of Consumer Reports exceeds three million copies 
per month.  CU copyrights each issue of Consumer Reports. 
 
CU alleges that it has gained a reputation over the past fifty 
years for impartial and objective testing of and reporting on 
consumer products.  To foster and maintain its reputation for 
objectivity, CU follows a non-commercialization policy.  Under 
that policy the organization accepts no outside advertising in 
any of its publications and has steadfastly refused to grant 
permission to others to use its name or copyrighted materials 
in advertisements.2  CU contends that this arms-length 
relationship with manufacturers distinguishes it from other 
testing organizations and publishers which provide consumer 
advice.  CU further asserts that were manufacturers 
routinely permitted to utilize its published evaluations and to 
associate its name with their products in advertising 
                                                          
2 Since 1936 each issue of Consumer Reports has stated in substance: 
Consumers Union accepts no advertising or product samples and is 
not beholden in any way to any commercial interest.  Its Ratings and 
product reports are solely for the use of readers of CONSUMER 
REPORTS.  Neither the Ratings nor the reports may be used in 
advertising or for any commercial purpose.  CU will take all steps 
open to it to prevent such uses of its material, its name, or the name 
of CONSUMER REPORTS. 
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campaigns, the public would lose confidence in CU’s 
neutrality. 
 
As a result, Consumers Union sued Regina for the advertisements 
principally on trademark and copyright grounds.  The district court 
initially granted Consumers Union a preliminary injunction on 
copyright grounds.  Regina appealed that to the Second Circuit, 
which reversed the injunction and sent the case back to the district 
court.  Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal 
Corp. 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 
730 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).  In the 
1987 ruling, Regina sought summary judgment.  The district court 
refused. 
 
On the copyright claim, Regina argued fair use, so the court assumed 
the validity of Consumers Union’s copyright and “that defendants’ 
quotation of portions of the Consumer Reports evaluation infringed 
CU’s copyright.”  That seems like a significant concession for Regina 
to make.  Do you think Regina took copyrightable portions of 
Consumers Union’s copyrights?  (Would you have noticed the 
potential copyright issue in quoting a consumer’s online review of 
your client’s product?) 
 
With respect to Regina’s copyright fair-use argument, “drawing the 
necessary inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the Court concluded 1) that 
defendants have not demonstrated that they are entitled to prevail on 
the defense of fair use as a matter of law, and 2) that triable issues of 
fact concerning harm to CU’s copyright remain.” 
 
Regarding the Lanham Act claim, the court said that the “ultimate 
issue in this case is whether there is any likelihood that an 
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be 
misled into believing that CU sponsored or otherwise approved the 
use of its mark in defendants’ advertisements.”  To establish this, 
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Consumers Union conducted two consumer surveys.  The surveys 
indicated that 19% of consumers who saw the “Squid” ad and 23% of 
those who saw the “Consumer Reports” ad agreed that Consumer 
Reports was “affiliated” with Regina.  The remainder either could not 
tell (48% for “Squid”/22% for “Consumer Reports”) or answered “no” 
(33%/55%).  Based on the ad, 9% of those who saw “Squid” thought 
Consumer Reports had been paid for the use of its name, and 25% of 
those who saw “Consumer Reports” did so.  Similar percentages of 
consumers thought Regina had paid Consumer Reports to test its 
product. 
 
In a second survey, “27% of those viewing ‘Squid’ and 45% of those 
viewing ‘Consumer Reports’ believed, based on the Commercial, that 
CONSUMER REPORTS had authorized the use of its name in the 
Commercials (those who responded “cannot tell” numbered 
64%/46%)”; while “13% of those viewing ‘Squid’ and 19% of those 
viewing ‘Consumer Reports’ believed, based on the Commercial, that 
CONSUMER REPORTS was affiliated with Regina (those who could not 
tell numbered 52%/29%)”; “15% of those viewing ‘Squid’ and 16% of 
those viewing ‘Consumer Reports’ believed, based on the Commercial, 
that CONSUMER REPORTS had been paid for the use of its name;” and 
nearly identical percentages believed that Regina had paid Consumer 
Reports to test its product. 
 
As usual, Regina objected to the survey, but let’s assume the survey 
results are scientifically defensible.  What do the results tell you 
about likely confusion over endorsement?  In general, the ad where 
Regina mentioned Consumer Reports four times had more 
problematic numbers than the ad where Regina mentioned the 
magazine only once.  What do you think the “baseline” level of 
confusion is? 
 
Based on the survey numbers, the court also said that it was not clear 
whether Regina’s disclaimers had effectively dispelled the confusion.  
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The court also sidestepped Regina’s First Amendment defense.  Thus, 
Regina could not avoid a trial on these claims. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Would it change the result if Regina used the same quotes but 
attributed them in a different manner?  Say, “to a leading 
independent testing organization” or “a leading consumer review 
publication.”  That would not resolve any copyright problems, but 
does it resolve the implied endorsement problem?  Would such an ad 
be as desirable to Regina?  Under the substantiation doctrine, how 
precisely must Regina identify the source of comparative factual 
claims? 
 
When publicity rights are in play, the legal decisions are even less 
clear.  For example, in 2007, Oprah said Ciao Bella Blood Orange 
Sorbetto was one of her “favorite things.”  Can Ciao Bella advertise 
this fact without obtaining Oprah’s permission?  Without Oprah’s 
permission, Ciao Bella would have to avoid any copyright issues, 
trademark issues (“Oprah” is a trademark) and publicity rights issues 
for using Oprah’s name in the ad copy.  How would the publicity 
rights analysis look?  How does the general lack of judicial sympathy 
shown toward advertisers in this chapter color your analysis? 
 
New York Times reviewer A.O. Scott found a partial tweet of his 
displayed in a full-page ad for a film, edited to look like a complete 
tweet.  Scott was disturbed by this result, and suggested that it 
shouldn’t have happened without his approval.  What’s different here 
than the standard practice of quoting published film reviews in movie 
ads (often without the reviewer’s permission)?  See Margaret 
Sullivan, When a (Partial) Tweet Becomes an Ad, What Are the 
Rules?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2014.  Is the standard practice itself a 
publicity rights problem?   
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Pinterest.  eSalon makes custom hair color.  It has a Pinterest page 
called Hair Colors We Love with pictures of celebrities. (Pinterest is a 
website where users can easily curate and present photos from other 
sources by “pinning” the photos to a user-controlled page).  The NAD 
found that the photos implied that the celebrities endorsed eSalon 
products, and recommended that eSalon only pin photos of celebrities 
who used eSalon.  eSalon, NAD Case No. 5645 (Oct. 17, 2013).  Do 
you agree that pinning photos with the caption “Hair Colors We Love” 
implies endorsement?  Even if it doesn’t imply endorsement, is there 
a right of publicity issue? 
 
Are Celebrity Endorsements Worth It?  There is some evidence that 
celebrity endorsements are not necessarily a good deal for 
advertisers.  See Peter Dabol, Celebrities in Advertising Are Almost 
Always a Big Waste of Money, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 12, 2011 (“[A] 
celebrity has little to no impact on an ad’s effectiveness.  In fact, 
regardless of gender or age, ads without celebrities out-performed ads 
with them”).  In contrast, consumer “word-of-mouth” 
recommendations have substantial selling power.  See, e.g., Jack Neff, 
GE Study Proves Consumers Respond More to Shared Content Than 
to Paid Placements, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 25, 2012. 
 
